Between 1500 and 1700, hundreds of thousands of soldiers served in the armies of the Spanish monarchs. Our knowledge of the conditions of service of these men is scant and largely limited to those who served in the Army of Flanders. This article examines the experience of soldiers in the regular armies and the militias in the Iberian peninsula during this period. With a focus on combat, physical and spiritual welfare and the culture of violence, it provides a range of insights into the reality of warfare in mainland Spain. It examines a number of variables which in uenced or arose from that experience. These include rates of attrition arising from desertion and casualities; the availability, use and effectiveness of weapons and munitions, along with evidence for ratios of the deployment of artillery; the nature of medical and spiritual assistance; food and drink; association with women; and engagement in and subjection to violence. The article provides incidental evidence for the use in the peninsula in the mid-seventeenth century of tactics associated with the Military Revolution, and for the violent interaction of soldiers with civilians.
uncovers the internal workings of the army in action and examines warfare in a social context. It explores the con icting interests, motivation and behaviour of soldiers, and the interaction of the military with the rest of society. 2 The 'war and society' approach, however, is not without its critics. They claim that war drops out of what become simply administrative studies.
3 While this article adopts a 'bottom-up' approach to study the soldiers of early modern Spain, it gives centre stage to war. Spain -or, more accurately, the composite Spanish monarchy 4 -was one of Europe's greatest military powers in the early modern period, and its armies were engaged almost continuously in con icts. Some studies for this period have been made of Spain's armies and soldiers in certain European theatres, yet relatively little is known about the soldiers who fought in the peninsula and defended the heart of the Spanish monarchy. 5 Many, though by no means all, were soldiers of the militias of Castile, civilians who for brief -or not so brief -periods had the unusual and often terrifying experience of taking up arms and participating in war; others were professional soldiers, both volunteers and conscripts, attached to the royal armies. 6 This article examines the reality of warfare in peninsular Spain through an analysis of the conditions of service of Spanish soldiers. It focuses on their experiences in combat and on their welfare, notably medical and spiritual care and physical comfort. It concludes with an examination of soldiers and violence.
again and, two years later, organized into provincial tercios. 10 From this time, because of the continual need to send reinforcements to the European war fronts, the militias came to form the backbone of peninsula defence, especially on the western front. On marching to their designated destination the militias were incorporated into the royal armies ( and royal pay) , and subject to the control of the army commander until he gave them leave to withdraw and return home. 11 What, then, was the experience of the soldiers who served in the peninsula in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? The description by a sixteenth-century Spanish historian gives us some idea of the general conditions under which soldiers served: 'to ght each day, with enemies, with the cold, heat, hunger, lack of supplies and equipment; everywhere new harm, continuous deaths, until we see the enemy . . .' 12 On top of these everyday conditions came the reality of battle. In Don Qu ixote Cervantes provided a short description that hints at the noise of battle, where 'close by there pealed the harsh thunder of dreadful artillery; further off countless musket shots rang out; almost at hand resounded the shouts of the combatants'. 13 Without doubt, for soldiers, and above all for raw recruits, battle provoked fear and alarm, and this in itself is enough to explain the high incidence of desertion prevalent in early modern Spain and elsewhere.
A ghting force was naturally expected to suffer losses in its ranks as a result of going into battle. Some evidence of the rate of attrition for an active military force is provided by a muster taken in Zubiburu in the Basque region at the end of the 1637 campaigning season against the French.
14 The soldiers recorded in this muster were from the three tercios of the adjacent provinces of the Basque region ( Guipú zcoa, Vizcaya and Alava) , the tercio of nearby Navarre, companies of the permanent garrisons of Guipú zcoa, several Castilian tercios, 15 infantry from the mountain passes of Irun and a body of Walloon infantry. Only 61 per cent of the original force of 7719 soldiers ( including 516 of cers) remained. Twenty-four men were absent with 10 The tercio was a Spanish military unit comprising, in the royal armies, anything from 3000 ( around the beginning of the sixteenth century) to 1000 ( more common by the seventeenth century) men. There is no suitable English translation, though 'regiment' is the term generally employed. On the formation of the provincial tercios see A( rchivo) G( eneral de) S( imancas) , G( uerra) A( ntigua) , leg ( ajo) 1195, n ( o) f ( olio) , 'Papel sobre la formacion de los tercios provinciales que empieza en el añ o de 1637 . . .'. 11 See White, 'War and Government', pp. 251-60. 12 D. Hurtado de Mendoza, Comen tarios de la Gu erra de Gran ada, M( emorial) H( istó rico) E( spañ ol) xlix ( Madrid, 1948) , p. 2, speaking of the war in Granada ( 1568-70) . On the characteristics of the 1640-68 war against Portugal, see White, 'War and Government', pp. 295-301, 'The Army in Action'. 13 M. de Cervantes, Don Qu ixote ( Harmondsworth, 1950) , pt 2, ch. 34, p. 698. 14 The exact location of Zubiburu is unknown, but it now probably lies in French territory. The muster is in AGS GA leg. 1184, n.f., 'Relació n de los of çiales y soldados q pareçieron y se hiçieron buenos en la muestra q se paso en 9 de octubre de 1637 . . .'. 15 These were listed as the 'old' tercios of Castile and three more Castilian tercios.
permission ( as they were considered un t for service) ; 1264 had deserted.
An analysis of those who deserted provides some interesting information: none of the deserters was an of cer, and while the rate of desertion among the entire force was 16 per cent, the four local tercios suffered a much higher rate of desertion -32 per cent. 16 Among these four tercios, the one with the highest rate was that of the province of Guipú zcoa -very close to where the muster was passed -with 54 per cent, followed by the tercio of neighbouring Vizcaya ( with 39 per cent) . This suggests that a higher rate of attrition through desertion could be expected from forces composed of soldiers enlisted from the regions closest to the theatre of war, as has been noted elsewhere. 17 Why was the rate of desertion so high? One reason was that the daily wage of 1 rea l paid to a common soldier -and from which his food other than the daily munition bread ration, and the shot and gunpowder he used, were deducted -was far lower than that paid even to an agricultural day labourer. In Cáceres in seventeenth-century Extremadura, for example, a day labourer could earn three times the soldier's daily wage plus three quarts of wine for each day he worked; in nearby Coria a wheat harvester could earn between four and a half or ve times a soldier's pay, with food. 18 Even pioneers hired temporarily by the army earnt three times as much as a common soldier, and received the same daily munition bread ration. 19 It was not just that the pay was, in don Quixote's opinion, 'wretched', but that it 'comes either late or never'.
20 It was no wonder, then, that to the conscriptedand often unpaid, hungry and destitute -soldier, the lure of higher wages and food or drink, even though the employment was only seasonal, was too great to resist. For this reason the highest rates of desertion generally coincided with the months of greatest agricultural activity -those in which sowing and harvesting took place. During the Luso-Spanish war of 1640-68, when summer arrived the militiamen of the garrisons of Extremadura deserted, almost to a man, to participate 16 The rate falls to 28.5% if we include the companies of the permanent garrisons of Guipú zcoa, which were probably composed of Castilians, not locals. 17 J. Mañ eru Ló pez and C. Cámara Fernández, 'El reclutamiento militar en Castilla a nales del siglo XVI: análisis de compañ |as de soldados levantadas en tierras de Burgos, Avila, Soria, Alava, La Rioja, Navarra, Segovia y Cáceres', La Organ ización Militar en los Sig los XV y XVI, Actas de las II Jorn ad as Nacion ales de Historia Militar ( Malaga 1993) ( hereafter Acta s) , pp. 179-89: 'It should be emphasized that the high number of deserters is related to the proximity of their place of origin' ( p. 187) ; see too Thompson , War an d Gov ern men t, p. 103, and G. Parker, 'The Soldier', in R. Villari, ed., Ba roqu e Person ae ( Chicago, 1995) p. 36, citing a commander of the Spanish Army of Flanders in 1630: 'troops native to the country where the war is fought disband very rapidly . . . ' . 18 See I. Testó n Nú ñ ez, 'La mentalidad del hombre extremeñ o en el siglo XVII ' ( doctoral thesis, 4 vols, Universidad de Extremadura, Cáceres, 1982) ii, p. 455. 19 In 1657 the commander of the Army of Extremadura offered to pay three reales a day to the pioneers needed to help for 8 days in the siege of Olivença. ( A) rchivo ( M) unicipal de ( M) é rida, ( Libro de) Acuerdos 1657, fos. 363-v. 20 Cervantes, Don Qu ixote, pt 1, ch. 38, p. 342. rst in the harvest of neighbouring Andalusia and then in that of the province; in autumn they again deserted and returned to their homes to carry out sowing.
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Another reason was the risk of death, injury or illness. It is quite dif cult to nd data on the numbers who died or were injured or fell ill. The information we possess often contains little or no detail to allow average casualty rates to be calculated. In addition, gures are usually exaggerated -when stating the size of enemy forces and their casualities -or minimized -when giving the number of domestic troops and casualities. Nevertheless, some rough calculations can be made. In the battle of Montijo in Extremadura in May 1644, for example, according to the Spanish accounts, of a total Spanish force of some 5700 soldiers ( 4000 infantry and 1700 cavalry) , a little under 8 per cent ( 433, including 276 infantry soldiers from the lower ranks and 100 cavalrymen) died on the day of battle. The sick and wounded constituted 7 per cent ( 375) , divided equally between the infantry and cavalry forces. The Spanish casualty rate was therefore around 15 per cent. Among the estimated 8600 Portuguese soldiers there was a much higher mortality rate of 3060 ( over 35 per cent) , and among the 586 prisoners were 170 badly wounded men. 22 Reports of the Portuguese commander reverse the gures: of a total force of 9100 ( 7000 infantry and 2100 cavalry) the Spanish lost more than 2600 men -a casualty rate of 28.6 per cent ( 2,000 dead, according to his second report, giving a mortality rate of 22 per cent) . From his own army of 7100 ( 6000 infantry and 1100 cavalry) , he claimed casualties were 300 killed or captured ( 4.2 per cent) and 400 wounded ( 5.6 per cent) . 23 their greater precision and the closer correlation of the Spanish accounts to casualty rates given elsewhere, it is possible that these accounts are less exaggerated than those of the Portuguese commander. Whatever the actual gure, mortality rates doubtless rose as some of the wounded died days, weeks or even months after the battle. The Zubiburu muster of 7719 soldiers contains similar gures for those killed: almost 9 per cent ( 672) of soldiers had been killed and 13.5 per cent ( 1042) were in hospital, wounded or ill. The casualty rate was therefore 22 per cent -not far off the 25 per cent casualty rate noted for the infamous battle of Malplaquet in 1709, which was considered to have been very heavy.
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A longer-term assessment of casualty rates is possible in the case of 35 militiamen sent from the Extremaduran town of Trujillo to the Catalan war front in 1640, where it appears they served for two campaigning seasons. A little under half ( 48 per cent, 16 men) of them died whilst serving; just over one third ( 34 per cent, 12 men) returned home; the remaining seven ( 20 per cent) stayed on to join the royal army. 25 This death rate over two years is similar to the suggested average of one death for every four or ve soldiers who enlisted each year in Baroque Europe. 26 These latter rates convert into a mortality rate of 200-250 per 1000, compared to 40 per 1000 calculated for the total population of Europe. 27 Such gures indicate that mortality among soldiers may have been between ve to six and a half times higher than the average for the rest of the population.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the risk of death or injury from rearms or cannon rose as the use of hand-held guns ( notably arquebuses and muskets) and eld artillery spread throughout Europe.
28 Spanish cavalry as well as infantry in the peninsula used rearms. Cavalrymen carried carbines and pistols -sometimes two of the latter -while some arquebusiers ( known as dragoons) were given horses to improve their mobility, though they still dismounted to re. It was anticipated that over a third ( almost 37 per cent) of the 2050 cavalrymen of the army of the Duke of Alba being mobilized in Extremadura to annex Portugal in 1580 would carry arquebuses; the rest of the cavalry was to carry javelins ( lan zas) -successors to the jin etes ( genitors) of medieval times. 30 A plan to form an army in Aragó n in the late 1570s envisaged that no less than 69 per cent of the total proposed force of 32 724 men would be armed with arquebuses, with a further 12 per cent armed with crossbows; only 19 per cent were to be armed with pikes and lances. 31 In the mid-seventeenth century the militias of Spain were armed with arquebuses, muskets and pikes. The proportion of rearms to pikes, at least by the early 1640s, ranged from three to one to three to two ( similar to the ideal ratio for Spanish armies in 1600) -higher, apparently, than that achieved in the French army at that time. 32 However, the risk of being killed or injured, though increased by the use of rearms, was apparently not as great as one might expect. First, in the peninsula during this period the use of cannon, especially light eld artillery, which could be devasting for infantry forces, 33 was still quite limited. Nevertheless, cannon were not always so deadly for those protected by forti cations. In the short ( but successful) siege in autumn 1642 of the castle at Ciudad Rodrigo, the Portuguese besiegers red ten rounds from their cannon, but killed only four of the defenders. 34 Few Castilian towns in the seventeenth century could afford to equip their militias as well as Jerez de la Frontera and Seville, which possessed six cannon each. 35 Where the size of the army and its artillery train is speci ed it is possible to calculate the ratio of cannon to soldiers. Initial plans for the army being formed in 1580 under the Duke of Alba on Portugal's border were for a total force of 17 100 and 12 cannon ( a ratio of 0.70 cannon per 1000 men) . 36 The 14 000-strong royal army that entered Aragon after the 1591 revolt took an unusually large artillery train comprising 25 cannon ( a ratio of 1.79 cannon per 1000 men) , though it proved unnecessary to re them. 37 The high ratio of cannon to men in the latter example was not repeated in the wars of the seventeenth century, though occasional rises were in evidence. In the war against Portugal between 1640 and 1668, eld artillery was rarely used because of the dearth of battles and major sieges until the end of the 1650s. In part this resulted from the desire of both sides to avoid major confrontations: the Portuguese could not risk the destruction of their armies, their sole defence, while the Castilians were reluctant to risk their honour and reputation by exposing their armies to possible defeat by so-called rebels. 38 There was also a major logistical problem: a serious shortage of carts and draft animals to transport the artillery trains.
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Cannon were employed, nevertheless, though less often in the eld than for defence purposes in forts and strongholds, where they were were used extensively. In the only battle between the two main armies in the 1640s -that of Montijo in May 1644 -the Portuguese had six cannon in an army of 8600 ( a ratio of 0.70 cannon per thousand men) ; the Spanish possessed only four cannon in their army of 5700 ( giving the same ratio) . The Spanish opened re with two small 10 lb cannon positioned in front of their main battle line. The Portuguese placed their cannon in pairs in three batteries, but red only a few times.
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In 1642 a Spanish force of 2300 ( 1500 infantry, 800 cavalry) that marched to Elvas, the headquarters of the Portuguese army, took only 36 M. Parrilla Hermida, 'La anexió n de Portugal en 1580. two small cannon ( a ratio of 0.87 per 1000 men) that 'served no purpose', as a contemporary remarked. 41 The Spanish army of 15 800 soldiers that laid siege ( unsuccessfully) to the Portuguese town of Elvas in 1644 possessed ten cannon and two mortars ( trabu cos) ( excluding the latter, a ratio of 0.63 cannon per 1000 men) . Elvas itself was defended by more than 50 cannon. 42 In 1646, during the successful relief of the Portuguese siege of Telena, near Badajoz, the Castilian relief army possessed eight cannon in a force of 7700 ( a ratio of 1.04 per 1000 men) . The Portuguese with 16 cannon and 10 500 soldiers ( 1.52 per 1000 men) clearly failed to make use of their advantage in both men and artillery. 43 The 11 000-strong Portuguese army that laid siege to Badajoz in 1657 possessed seven cannon, giving a ratio of 0.64 cannon per 1000 men. 44 Even in the 1660s, when the size of both armies and artillery trains increased signi cantly, the ratio of cannon to men was little different. In 1663, for example, the Spanish army of 16 000 at the battle of Ameixial had 18 cannon -1.1 cannon per 1000 men. At Estremoz in 1665 the Portuguese had 20 cannon in their relief army of 25 000 -0.80 cannon per 1000 men. 45 Though these mid-seventeenthcentury artillery ratios on Spain's main war front in the west seem modest, they were nonetheless similar to those calculated for the French army of the same period, which ranged from 0.75 to 1.36 per 1000 men.
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A second reason the risk of death or injury from artillery and small arms was not as great as one would expect was the limited supplies of gunpowder and shot which restricted their deployment. In September 1643 the 1500-strong garrison in the Castilian village of Valverde was forced to capitulate to the Portuguese besiegers because it had run out of cannonballs, and the town of Encinasola feared that it would be the next to be besieged as it had only two days' supply of gunpowder. 47 It is clear that armies and soldiers were continually undersupplied with gunpowder. In 1580 the Duke of Alba was provided with 3500 qu in tales ( about 161 000 kilos) of gunpowder, but thought that 41 Jesu it Letters xvi, pp. 281-2. 42 this amount would meet less than two thirds of his needs. 48 On the same war front almost 80 years later, the main Portuguese army in the Alentejo region was supplied with only 100 qu in tales ( barely 4600 kilos) in 1641. 49 When the commander of the Army of Extremadura requested 3000 qu in tales ( about 138 000 kilos) of gunpowder for the 1659 campaign, the central Junta of War for Spain revealed that total supplies for defence in the peninsula ( that is, for the navy and coastal and frontier garrisons plus the three major war fronts in Catalonia, Extremadura and Galicia) , were only 1427 qu in tales ( 65 646 kilos) -less than half of what was required in Extremadura alone.
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Supplies of gunpowder and especially shot available to individual soldiers were also limited. Spanish soldiers armed with small arms carried a ask of gunpowder, small asks of measured gunpowder charges ( frasqu illas, probably on a bandolier) , and a pouch containing lead shot. 51 Even with the normal issue of gunpowder -one pound weight each -and a generous supply of lead shot -20 bullets each ( compared to 15 in the French army circa 1690) -well-trained soldiers who discharged their weapons continuously and managed to re the maximum one or two rounds per minute ( discounting the average of one in six mis res, one in four when conditions deteriorated) -would have exhausted their supply of shot in ten to 20 minutes. 52 This occurred at Montijo in 1644. After opening the battle with artillery, arquebus and musket re, the Spanish infantry then closed in with pikes and swords. 53 However, even if they were well trained and did not waste gunpowder when charging their weapons, it is doubtful if soldiers and gunners in the peninsula ever possessed adequate supplies of munitions to reach even these moderate bursts of repower. There is evidence to suggest that throughout the 1640-68 war, though militiamen in the regular and auxiliary companies were each issued with the standard one pound weight of gunpowder, and while some may 48 Thompson have received as many as 20 shot each, most were issued with a much smaller number -just four or six bullets each. 54 Clearly this placed severe restrictions on the deployment of small arms. Some soldiers were issued with even fewer shot. When militia soldiers of Seville were issued with muskets -a mere ten per company! -to patrol the streets and avert a possible uprising by Portuguese residents, they were given just two bullets each. 55 Additional supplies may, it is true, have been held in reserve for the soldiers. At the 1644 battle of Montijo, each squadron of Castilian infantry had gunpowder, shot and match in the rearguard. 56 It is unlikely, however, that soldiers could access them in the heat of a land battle, unlike those on board Spain's galleys, who could rush to recharge their asks from barrels of gunpowder and obtain shot and cord placed on every fth oarsman's bench. 57 Shortages in the peninsula, however, were not just limited to munitions. Arms were generally in short supply in the peninsula. Surveys carried out in 1588 revealed dire shortages of serviceable modern arms ( above all handguns) across Castile, especially in the interior regions and, within these, in rural areas. 58 In the 1630s and 1640s, with the constant supply of arms to the peninsula's eastern war fronts, the militia companies of Castile's towns and villages were left virtually unarmed. 59 Sign i cantly, 'unarmed' meant that though soldiers might 54 The gure of 4 shot per soldier is calculated from the proposed allocation of 25 lb of shot to each of the captains of Coria's militia companies, which each comprised 100 men, and an estimate of 16 shot per pound, at 1 oz per shot ( the typical weight of an arquebus ball) . AyC 7, Acuerdos 1647-49, n.f. Op. cit. 7-3, Acuerdos, fo. 304v, specifying the distribution of 1 lb, or failing that half a pound, and 20 or 6 shot to each man. 59 See e.g. AMT 1-3-87, fos. 125-6, 12 Dec. 1637: 'he is still trying to arrange if the said company of 100 soldiers can be armed and he will report on progress and he also sends a testimony of the arquebuses and arms he has, advising that most of the militiamen are unarmed because there are no more arquebuses or arms than those that have been registered'; and A( rchivo) M( unicipal de) A( rroyo de la) L( uz) , leg. 2, Acuerdos, 1607-70, n.f.: 'it seems that there are no suitable arms available for what has been ordered . . . because those we had were taken by the company that left this v illa for Catalonia'; AGS GA leg. 1347, n.f., memorial of the Duke of Medina carry a sword, they lacked small arms. 60 In 1632, over 70 per cent of the 43 541 men enlisted in Castile's militias were without arms. The best two of the 16 districts respectively had only 3.5 and 9.8 per cent unarmed men; the worst eight indicated that over 90 per cent of their men were unarmed, and three of these had failed to arm a single man. 61 The situation did not really begin to improve until the later 1630s, when serious steps were taken to supply the militias -which from that time formed the core of the peninsula armies -and local auxiliary shock troops ( socorros) with arms. A review of over 100 militia companies in about 1636 revealed that only around one quarter of the more than 11 000 soldiers were unarmed. Almost half were armed with rearms, while the remaining 25 per cent had pikes. 62 By the end of the century, however, the situation had deteriorated once again, for more than 87 per cent of the 465 000 militiamen listed in the registers were unarmed. 63 The shortage of rearms and other conventional weapons, however, did not stop soldiers from ghting or prevent them from wounding or killing their opponents. In their place they employed whatever weapons came to hand. During the revolt of 1568-70 in Granada, the moriscos employed large catapults, traditional weapons of war. From the peak of Fijliana overlooking Torrox, some of the 3000 moriscos pelted the Christian attacking force with a hail of stones. Some managed to pierce or penetrate the Christians' round shields, killing at least 20 men and wounding 150. 64 In 1641 a troop of hastily levied Castilian militias which went to relieve a siege mounted by the Portuguese on the frontier stronghold of San Mart|n, supplemented the few arquebuses they possessed with slings. With these they rained down stones on the enemy, in icting serious casualties, and helped to save the fort Sidonia, reporting that the men on his estate had no arms; op. cit., 1469, n.f., con su lta, containing information about the arrival in Badajoz of 500 soldiers from Mérida and Feria, almost all unarmed. 60 from capture. 65 Even in major encounters during the Thirty Years War, soldiers resorted to these basic weapons: stones as well as musket shot and grenades were hurled down on four Spanish soldiers who made a midnight sortie across a moat to mine a wall during the 1642 siege of La Bassé . 66 Regarding the rearms in use in early modern Spain, arquebuses were used in greater number than muskets, perhaps in a ratio of two to one in the mid-seventeenth century. 67 Arquebuses were often preferred for their relative ease of use: muskets were anything from a quarter to three-quarters heavier than the 11-12 pound arquebus and, with their six feet overall length, could only be red when propped up on a forked rest. 68 Muskets had a calibre of between 0.7 and 0.9, compared to 0.6 for the arquebus, and red a heavier shot -between one and half to two ounces, compared to just one ounce for the latter. 69 In France, the arquebus per se disappeared from service in the 1620s, and the weight of the musket started to be reduced from around the middle of the century, producing a diversity of calibres and major problems in supplying soldiers with the correct size of shot. 70 In contrast, soldiers in the Spanish peninsula continued to use both types of weapon. Though elite companies of grenadiers ( gran ad eros) armed with intlock guns and plug bayonets were rst established in 1685, matchlock muskets and arquebuses continued in general use until early in the eighteenth century. to capture the wall of the stronghold also employed stones against the defenders. 66 Jesu it Letters xvi, p. 407. Stones were also thrown from the tops of masts on Spanish ships: Pérez-Malla|na, Men of the Sea, p. 184. 67 As in the case of the militias of Mérida, where the town decided to buy 1000 arquebuses and 500 muskets. AMM Acuerdos, fo. 102-v, 28 Sept. 1643. A year later, however, Trujillo took delivery of an equal number of muskets and arquebuses -300 each -while 2 years earlier Mé rida had armed 2 companies of soldiers with muskets and pikes only. AMT 1-3-94-1, fo. 94v, 17 June 1644; AMM Acuerdos, fo. 62, 13 July 1641. 68 Mu skets could weigh 15-20 lb and had an overall length between 5.6 and 6.2 ft.
Weights and dimensions, however, are only approximate, as at this time there was no standardization of weapons. Moreover, the size, calibre and weight of the musket was reduced in the later seventeenth century to around 4 ft, 13 lb, and around 0.8 calibre. The later musket was therefore only slightly larger than the average arquebus, and 'musket' became the generic name for all small arms. See Tallet In the peninsula ( as elsewhere) muskets were employed to best effect for defensive purposes, though they also had uses in offensives. Hence they were deployed from or against city or castle walls by besieged ( who sometimes loaded them with scattershot for even better effect) and besiegers alike, or against cavalry, especially by infantry in skirmishing parties. 72 Because of their value in defence and for skirmishes, muskets made regular appearances in the lists of rearms purchased for town militias in the border and coastal regions. 73 Nevertheless, though muzzle velocities of round shot in this period were supersonic or nearly supersonic ( depending on the gunpowder charge) , heavy drag reduced a bullet's kinetic energy by about one half during the rst 100 metres of igh t. 74 This limited the musket's lethal range to about 110-30 yards, while that of the arquebus was around 60 yards. 75 The Duke of Alba, however, recommended an effective distance 'of a little more than two pike lengths' -around 12 yardsto his arquebusiers. 76 These killing zones were even narrower if the opposing forces wore some form of body armour. 77 In the battle of 79 This was clearly appreciated by the soldiers themselves, for they spoke of being 'within musket range' ( a m en os de u n tiro de m osqu ete) or 'out of arquebus range' ( a ma´s de u n tiro de arcabu z) .
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While muskets and arquebuses had a serious inherent problem with accuracy, 81 apparent feats of individual marksmanship were not unknown. In November 1640, a soldier in the Spanish army deployed to put down the revolt in Catalonia red his musket at an elderly woman who climbed a tower to raise the alarm. He hit his target, and the unfortunate woman fell to the ground. 82 Such feats of marksmanship must have been rare, however, for besides the inherent inaccuracy of small arms, an added problem was the effect of the recoil, especially from muskets. As a result, they tended to re high, especially when they were handled by new recruits. 83 eran of the Thirty Years War, to counsel that soldiers should aim 'never higher or lower than levell with the enemies' middle'.
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It seems likely, however, that many musketeers did not aim at all, or that they did not aim at a particular human target. 86 Indeed, new recruits were terri ed of rearms and took some time to grow accustomed to ring them. 87 In 1568 a commentator described just how badly some Spanish soldiers handled their weapons:
To re their arquebuses they charge them to the mouth [ of the gun] with powder; they take hold of them half way along the barrel with their left hand and move their arm as far away as they can, to prevent the re from touching them ( as they are so afraid of it) ; and when they light it with the wick in their other hand they turn their face away, just like those who are waiting for the bloodletter to open a vein; and even when they re they close their eyes and go pale, and shake like an old house. 88 On top of this, the performance of muskets and arquebuses deteriorated and the rate of mis res increased as their barrels fouled up with combustion residues. Even with regular cleaning, mis res might average between one in eight and one in six; they increased to one in two as conditions deteriorated. 89 In wet weather, as both the match and the gunpowder were affected, small arms could not be red, and strong winds also impeded their use.
The inaccuracy and unreliability of the weapons, not to mention the variable skill of the user, especially under battle conditions, clearly affected the ef cacy of small arms in battle. Their effectiveness lay, however, not in individual feats of marksmanship, but in volume when employed in volley re, 90 especially against large targets. On the battleeld, massed infantry in line formation provided a suitably large target. So, too, did cavalry -men and horses alike -when they charged en into the air. 85 ma sse as a troop ( ranging from three abreast to as many as 18, 20 or 30, and anything from two to three, six or even sixteen rows deep) . Cavalry was equally vulnerable when it performed a caracole manoeuvre, with each le of a formation that was typically 15 or 16 ranks deep trotting at intervals, one after the other, to within a few yards of the infantry formation before ring their pistols and wheeling to one side. 91 Though there are no reliable gures for the accuracy of small arms in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one estimate for musket re assumes a 10-15 per cent chance of a hit at 100 yards, and at that range envisages no more than one man in 15 being hit.
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Estimates for more modern weapons indicate that, under ideal conditions, muskets could expect to hit a given target with only 10-20 per cent of shots attempted. In practice, however, it was likely to be much lower -at best 5 per cent, or at worst, 0.2 to 0.5 per cent ( i.e. one bullet in 200 to one in 500 striking home) . 93 Precise gures for the effectiveness of small arms in Spain are almost impossible to come by, but occasional insights can be gleaned. For example, in the afternoon of the rst day of the Portuguese siege of Badajoz in September 1643, when the besieging forces red volleys at the Spanish defenders on the walls, after several hours they had only killed six or seven men and wounded about twenty. 94 It is important, however, to distinguish between the effectiveness of small arms in battles and in sieges. Small arms were clearly more effective when deployed against troops in massed formations on the battle eld. They were far less effective when used against defenders taking shelter behind forti cations. 91 On cavalry tactics, see Carlton summarizes tests on muskets conducted in the eighteenth century shooting at a target roughly equal in size to the frontal area presented by an enemy battalion ( about 100 ft long by 7 ft high) : only 60% of bullets penetrated the target from 82 yds, 40% from 164 yds, 25% from 246 yds, and only 20% from 328 yds. On pp. 140-1 he gives the results of the modern Austrian tests, though the target here approximated the frontal area of a standing human being: the average probability of muskets scoring any hit at 109 yds was a little more than 50% ( all distances converted from metres) . Lynn, Gian t, p. 458, n. 17, provides results of tests conducted during the Napoleonic era on weapons ballistically the same as earlier matchlocks: they could hit a 'large target' 75% of the time at 80 yds; at 120 yards they could hit a 'small target' 50% of the time, and at 160 yds accuracy fell to only 25%. Signi cantly, all of the tests were conducted in shooting ranges, not under battle conditions. 94 Jesu it Letters xvii, pp. 249-51. As for the Portuguese besiegers, who numbered about 8000, their casualties were far higher: in the rst 5 days some 150 were killed and 200 wounded, mainly by artillery shot red from the town.
Finally, to the imprecision in ring small arms must be added an even greater hindrance that is often overlooked -the dense clouds of smoke that obscured the battle eld from the time the action got under way. In dry weather conditions, dust clouds could also cause problems. During an attack on the Portuguese settlement of Otero Seco in 1643, a Galician cavalry squadron was lucky not to suffer any casualties from friendly re when cavalrymen discharged their rearms during a mê lé e where the dust was so thick that they could not make out their own comrades. 95 Despite the apparent shortages of lead shot in the peninsula, there is evidence to suggest that Spanish soldiers employed the latest tactics of early modern warfare. In 1644, for example, when a Castilian raiding force of 250 cavalry and 250 musketeers found itself being closed in by 1000 Portuguese shock infantry troops and 100 cavalry, the musketeers red off two or three volleys and brought down almost 100 Portuguese. This was suf cient to cause the rest of the Portuguese to ee, leaving the Castilians to escape with their booty. 96 Moreover, a year earlier, in a night assault, the Portuguese used drums to coordinate the salvos of their musketeers, and were well aware of the fear and confusion such volleys caused among those who came under re. 97 The tactics of the Military Revolution -including a reduction in the size of infantry units to around 500 men, the thinning of formations in which soldiers stood just six ranks deep, the deployment of musketeers in lines eight ranks deep, and ring salvos -were clearly in evidence in peninsular Spain by the middle of the seventeenth century. 98 Nevertheless, soldiers were killed and wounded by rearms and by cannonballs, as well as by the more traditional hand-to-hand ghting of sword and pike. Some were killed or wounded by small arms through 95 Op. cit., p. 273. 96 Op. cit., p. 458. 97 Orders to employ these tactics were given by a Portuguese mestre de ca mpo in 1643 to a troop of 50 musketeers who were ordered to re on the rearguard of the Galician army making a night attack on the trenches guarding the recently conquered Galician castle of Salvatierra. The musketeers were directed to repeat their salvoes. 100 The careless handling of the glowing match used by soldiers to ignite the priming charges of gunpowder in their arquebuses and muskets was another danger, and particularly hazardous as they carried measured charges of powder in small asks hanging from bandoliers across their chests. As one historian has noted, it almost made soldiers walking bombs. 101 The soldiers themselves ( and civilians too, it seems) were well aware of this danger. In 1643 Portuguese inhabitants near the border with Galicia set re to the brush in surrounding hills in an effort to deter a Spanish raiding party. The soldiers, all carrying munitions, along with the reserve gunpowder supplies they transported with them, were in danger of being blown up as they carefully picked their way to safety through the re. 102 Even small arms that were charged with gunpowder but lacked shot could be lethal. 103 What, then, were the soldiers' chances of survival, and what medical assistance did they receive?
II
In early modern Spain, health care for the sick and wounded ( civilians as well as soldiers) was undertaken by a variety of providers: an elite corps of university-trained physicians and surgeons, 104 vocationally trained surgeons and barber-surgeons, certain orders of hospitallers ( for example, St John of God) , permanent hospitals ( usually based in monasteries) or camp hospitals ( which were set up in tents to serve a particular army and moved with it) , 105 quacks ( cu ran d eros) and camp followers ( generally women) . Soldiers and sailors in the major ports used by the Spanish navy were treated in the local civil hospitals, often overwhelming their limited resources; permanent military hospitals were established in some ports only from the later sixteenth century. From about 1574, soldiers stationed in the Navarrese town of Pamplona were treated in what seems to have been the only permanent military hospital in the interior. 106 Field hospitals were also set up, for example, in the centre of action on the edge of the Alpujarras during the m orisco uprising ( 1568-70) , and in tents in Extremadura for the army that annexed Portugal in 1580. 107 This seeming abundance of assistance, however, was not always available to the early modern Spanish soldier, or if forthcoming, it arrived rather late in the day -literally! The surprise is perhaps that the death rates were not higher. The injured were only attended to after the battle or military encounter had ended, so it is probable that only the strongest or less seriously wounded survived even to the end of the day of battle.
108 Nevertheless, it is likely that a signi cant number of those soldiers lucky enough to survive beyond the day of battle died in the days and weeks that followed as a result of shock, peritonitis, dehydration and loss of blood, though more from blood letting than from wounds. 109 Those unlucky enough to fall ill or be wounded in a besieged fort or stronghold probably fared even worse, for they were wholly reliant on whatever supplies, assistance and expertise, medical or otherwise, were available within the enclosure under siege. In the event that the defenders decided ( sometimes after resisting for several months) to capitulate to the besiegers, it was usual for carts and beasts of burden to be provided to evacuate the sick and wounded.
110 Their misery and suffering did not end there, however, for they were then subject to the ordeal of a tortuous journey along the notoriously poor roads of that period, and some at least must have deteriorated or expired along the way. 1658 after a 4-month siege, contained in BNM, VC/56/144, 'Diaria relacion de lo svcedido'. 111 After the fall of Perpignan to the French in Sept. 1642, the terms of the capitulation were said to include the transport of the sick Spanish troops to Tarragona, a journey of about 12 km by land followed by some 290 by sea. The healthy were to go to Rosas. Jesu it Letters xix, p. 339.
For the wounded who had access to medical treatment, a fteenthcentury manual makes the surgeon's work in healing wounds sound straightforward. It divided his tasks into three stages: rst, staunching the ow of blood, second, guarding the wound against infection, and nally, curing it with medicine and appropriate measures. 112 Contemporary accounts show just how gruesome this was in practice.
For those injured in military actions or armed encounters, sixteenthcentury doctors and surgeons had become reasonably competent in the treatment of sword wounds or, where necessary, in performing amputations or dealing with the loss of limb caused by cannon-re. Up to the sixteenth century, the most common form of treatment after such amputations was to cauterize the wound by burning it with hot metal or boiling oil. 113 In the absence of anaesthetic, this must frequently have sent the patient into shock. An equally effective though less traumatic form of treatment that came into use in the sixteenth century was the application of thick animal fat to seal the wound. 114 Increasingly, however, ligatures were employed to secure arteries and cauterization was curtailed. 115 In the case of simple open wounds like those caused by pikes or sword strokes, hemp bres soaked in cold water and egg white were used to stop the ow of blood, and the edges of the wound were drawn together and sewn up with a needle and thread, leaving an opening at the lower end for any pus to escape. 116 The treatment of wounds caused by projectiles -initially arrows but increasingly, in the early modern period, shot from rearms -was, however, much more dif cult and complicated. The projectile penetrated deeply, causing internal bleeding, and was coated with fragments of dirt, grit or gunpowder. It frequently shattered bones, usually remained in the body, and resulted in a much higher incidence of infection and, ultimately, of death. 117 Until the middle of the sixteenth century surgeons generally poured boiling oil into the wound and employed various arti ces and implements to clean the wound and extract the shot. This method ( known as pu s lau da ble) consisted of inserting a piece of pork fat or string and moving it around to encour-age suppuration and the natural expulsion of the shot. To complete the healing of the wound, it was covered with a poultice. However, in the mid-sixteenth century the French surgeon, Paré, accidentally discovered a treatment that dispensed with the use of boiling oil. This was the 'digestive', 'dry' or aseptic method that used an astringent solution of turpentine, rosewater and other essences. Not surprisingly, its use spread rapidly throughout Europe. 118 Infection was an ever-present danger, so in an attempt to prevent it wounds were washed with a mixture of water and chamomile, and dusted with verdigris. 119 A poultice or an astringent mixture of wine and pomegranate was sometimes applied later. Finally, ointments made from red or white lead were applied. After that, the patient was purged, then fed on a nutritious diet. 120 If the patient survived and the wound continued to weep or suppurate, it was washed with an astringent mixture at least once a day. If fever set in, the doctor was summoned and once again the unfortunate soldier was subjected to purging. 121 A Toledan nobleman, Don Juan de Silva, has provided us with a graphic account of his treatment for and recovery from a rearms wound. As ambassador of Philip II to the Portuguese court, he accompanied the ill-fated Portuguese King Sebastian on his crusade to north Africa. At the battle of Alcaçer Quibir on 4 August 1578 he received 'a considerable arquebus wound in the left arm'. 122 He rst reported on his health after returning to Spain at the end of 1578 ( almost ve months after being wounded) :
Here in Gibraltar the state of my arm has now allowed me to get up for a short time during the day. I have seven wounds that the surgeons have had to make in my arm because each one festered as a result of the problems and bad treatment I had in the rst 40 days. Four of these wounds have now been covered with cloth and balm and have almost healed over; three are in the very joint of my elbow and are so stubborn, and the two very small ones, so resistant to the medicine that for two months nothing has been able to heal them; another one is in the inner angle of my elbow and should be healed in about two weeks; but those two I mentioned are causing me so much trouble and are so sore and painful that I fear that they will not heal up for a very long time, and some sweat [ a poultice?] or re [cauterization] will be needed to heal them, because the surgeon has tried every method he knows, to no avail.
123
One and a half months later ( and six and a half months after being wounded) he wrote from Seville with further news and recounted how:
When I was about to leave at 8 o'clock . . . they found a bone that was sticking out of that small wound they had tried to close. There wasn't room even for a lentil to t, and the bone was so big that it looked as though it would not t through anything but a big hole. When the surgeon tried the next day to widen the wound with sponges and other devices, it was so dif cult, but he started to pull the bone out with his hand and made room for it till it came out. The bone is an inch thick, and the length of three ngers; it was God's great favour to reveal it and remove it with so little damagethough with a lot of pain. That same day, from another wound that I have on the inside of my elbow, another bone came out without any pain, though it left a large wound in my elbow that has now closed up these last few days, and seems to be healing. I was doubtful and very unconcerned about nding the shot, and when one day I went to take my pulse, I found it in that very spot, on the inside of my arm between the muscles, about a nger's length from where my hand joint is. It is amazing that it had travelled from alongside my shoulder to reach this spot, without me having felt it set off, move or stop. 124 In spite of his wounds, Don Juan was lucky enough to survive -unlike the count of Losestein, a German colonel in the service of Philip IV who died two weeks after receiving a pistol shot, also in the arm, at the battle of Ameixial in 1663, or the unfortunate Marquis of Torralbo who died in Badajoz a few days after a bullet passed through his hand.
125 Though Don Juan's arm did not have to be amputated, ve and half months after being wounded, he was still only able to get out of bed for a short time each day. Not surprisingly his arm was useless and, like his more famous contemporary, Cervantes, who was wounded in 1571 in the renowned naval battle of Lepanto, he was nicknamed 'the one-armed man' ( el m an co) . Nevertheless, Don Juan's was only an arm wound. Moreover, as a nobleman and ambassador in the service of Philip II, he could not only solicit special treatment because of his ability to pay in cash or in kind; he also presented his captors with the potential reward of a lucrative ransom. It is probable, therefore, that he received prompt medical attention immediately after the battledespite his complaints that it was 'bad'. On his return to Spain his wealth and status secured regular access to the services of a doctor and surgeon. Perhaps like one of the captains under whom the biographersoldier Miguel de Castro served, he was even attended by several doctors and surgeons. 126 Another notable survivor of a rearm wound, this time in the head, was the commander of the Army of Extremadura in 1659, but again it can be assumed that he received the best medical attention available. 127 The more usual fate of soldiers with rearms wounds was revealed by Don Luis de Requesens, captain general of the Spanish Army of Flanders. In 1575 he wrote that many of his soldiers had been wounded and that 'most of the wounds come from pikes or blows, and they will soon heal, although there are also many with gunshot wounds [a rcabu za zos] , and they will die'.
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Army hospitals dealt as much with those who fell ill -those who succumbed to endemic illnesses and epidemics such as typhus, syphilis or plague -as with those who were wounded in battle. As English historian John Hale declared, if half of Europe's soldiers died, the majority were killed by bacteria rather than bullets. 129 In early 1641, even before ghting broke out in the war for Portuguese independence, a request was sent to the council of war in Madrid to form a hospital to care for the soldiers arriving in Extremadura, who were already falling ill. 130 Three months later, central government ordered the establishment of a hospital by the brothers of the order of St John of God in the town of Mé rida, the rst base of the Army of Extremadura. The projected level of care for an army that was expected to number 24 000 was hardly encouraging, for the hospital was to have just one doctor and an apothecary. For each sick person treated the hospital was to receive two and a half times a soldier's daily pay ( two and a half reales) .
131 Sign i cantly, the soldiers themselves were obliged to contribute to the running costs of the hospitals through a monthly deduction from their pay of one and a half reales. 132 In effect, they were funding a military health insurance scheme.
Though it has been claimed that Spain did far more than any other European state in the provision of health care for its forces, 133 it is unlikely that many Spanish soldiers were treated by an expert surgeon, or that they went to a hospital. The experience of English sailors who fought in the English Mediterranean eet during the war of 1702-13 was similar. 134 The reason was that the number of doctors and surgeons attached to Spanish armies was generally quite low. The army being sent to Algeria ( North Africa) in 1572 that was to comprise 30 000 infantry and 600 cavalry was to be accompanied by just four doctors, four apothecaries and 25 surgeons 135 -an average of one surgeon for every 1200 men and one doctor for 7650. Alba's army of 17 100 in 1580 was far less well provided for, for it had just one surgeon ( increased to two after four months) , one barber-surgeon and one doctor -an average of one surgeon for every 8550 men, or 5700 if the barbersurgeon is included, and only one doctor for the entire army. 136 In the middle of the campaigning season of 1643, the commander of the Army of Extremadura complained that the army had no doctors or surgeons at all. 137 In 1660, for an anticipated force of 26 000 men, the same army was allocated one master surgeon, four ordinary surgeons, one surgeon general ( protom ed ico) , one doctor, four barber-surgeons, eight nurses and one apothecary -approximately one surgeon for every 2900 men and only one doctor for every 13 000. The following year, for an army of 15 000 men, there was a marked improvement in the provision of healthcare: ve doctors, a protom edico, a master doctor ( m estre m édico) , a licensed surgeon for the army and another for the hospitals, and nine surgeons -approximately one surgeon for every 1360 soldiers and one doctor for every 2140 -in addition to 12 practitioners and bloodletters. 138 As for the army hospitals, in 1580 Alba's 17 100-strong army in Extremadura was given 100 beds: one bed for every 171 men. In the same province in 1660, the anticipated force of 26 000 men was to be allocated only 50 beds: one for every 520 men. The following year the number of beds provided had risen markedly to 2000 -one for every 7 soldiers. 139 This was an unusually large number. Sick and wounded soldiers were frequently placed two to a bed and others were merely accommodated on the oor. When the army hospitals were overwhelmed, the sick and wounded were sent to civilian hospitals, or were cared for in the houses of obliging civilians.
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Because of this shortage of quali ed medical practitioners, each of the companies in the Spanish royal armies ( which generally had a complement of 250 men in the sixteenth century, and 100 in the seventeenth) possessed a barber-surgeon, and each cavalry squadron had its own master surgeon. Though the barber-surgeons were less quali ed than the surgeons and, it seems clear, did not possess the same array of surgical instruments or medications, they were at least closer at hand for the sick and wounded soldiers in their companies. Nevertheless, given the low overall proportion of quali ed doctors and surgeons to soldiers, it seem certain that the initial ( and maybe the only) medical assistance given to soldiers was that offered by their comrades in arms or by women camp-followers, 141 supplemented, perhaps, by the attendance of the barber-surgeons from their own companies. Perhaps the overall lack of surgeons was not such a bad thing for, if English military surgeon William Clowes was correct, bad surgeons had killed more men than the enemy!
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III
No study of welfare would be complete without examining provisions for the physical comfort and spiritual wellbeing of Spain's peninsular soldiers. Obtaining adequate supplies of food and drink was essential for their physical comfort. While munition bread was their staple food -one and a half pounds of wheat bread daily -it was accompanied by oil and vinegar, and either dried cod, cheese, bacon ( tocin o) , salt pork or fresh meat ( beef or lamb) . 143 Bread, meat or cheese and sardines were commonly supplied to soldiers on the march. 144 They washed their food down with generous quantities of wine, though not as much as some manual workers received. While an average Extremaduran household in the mid-seventeenth century may 140 have consumed about two pints of wine a day, soldiers in the province were supplied with two to four pints of wine daily; day labourers got six. 145 The wine, though, may have been watered down ( as it was for Spanish sailors) , so that it animated the soldiers without clouding their judgement. 146 Rarely, however, did soldiers receive adequate supplies of food and drink on a regular basis from the army purveyors. Supplies were continually disrupted, whether by natural disasters such as harvest failure ( caused by oods, drought or locusts) or, more often, by the lack of money to pay the contractors and victuallers. 147 Hungry soldiers either deserted or stole. When the French sent troops to Catalonia in October 1640 to support the revolt there, the Duke of Modena's tercio defected to the French, saying they were dying of hunger: in the previous two days they had eaten only grapes. 148 Those holed up in sieges had neither of these options. The daily food ration of the 2500 Spanish soldiers under siege in 1642 by the French in Perpignan was reduced to three ounces of cow or horse hide each, soaked in liquid. Not surprisingly, about 2000 of the men died and only 500 survived, though they 'looked like the picture of death' when the siege ended. 149 However, soldiers robbed and stole even when they were not hungry, and revealed their preference for a more varied diet. Four companies of dragoons who spent a night in transit in an Extremaduran village in early 1638 were offered sh ( as it was Friday) , but took chickens ( and other items) from the villagers. 150 When soldiers raided enemy territory, however, their main preoccupation was in seizing livestock and other goods to sell rather than to consume themselves.
A comfort or perk traditionally associated with military life was the soldier's association with prostitutes and concubines. 151 A Spanish discourse on military discipline of the later sixteenth century advocated that 'in order to avoid disorders, as well-ordered republics permitted such people [ prostitutes] , in no other republic was it more necessary to allow them than among free and tough men who would mistreat inhabitants, molesting [ procu ran do] their wives, daughters and sisters'. Moreover, it continued, 'it would be dangerous not to have them, but they must be shared [ser com u n es] '. 152 Army commanders and even of cial military orders therefore recommended and sanctioned the presence in each company of anything from three to eight whores 153 a ratio of between two and eight per 100 men. In practice, the number may sometimes have been higher, though contemporary records make no distinction between prostitutes and soldiers' wives. The four companies of dragoons ( probably comprising no more than 200 men) who passed through the Extremaduran village of Las Brozas in 1638 were accompanied by 'twenty women of ill repute'. 154 A group of 16 Irish soldiers who spent a night in transit in Zurita, another Extremaduran village, were accompanied by a woman with a small child. In an apparent effort to impose a modicum of decency on the soldiers, the woman was lodged separately in the house of the local priest. 155 Garrison towns in the peninsula naturally attracted large numbers of prostitutes to serve the needs of the soldiers. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that they were still nominally attached to individual companies. In 1662, for example, when Philip IV issued one of his regular orders to punish and stamp out 'public sins' and swearing, a colonel ( m aestre de cam po) billeted in Badajoz, headquarters of the Army of Extremadura, was ordered to expel and exile the prostitutes in his tercio. 156 Nevertheless, soldiers clearly found comfort from women other than professional prostitutes. 157 While some women willingly entered into liaisons, 158 soldiers frequently took their pleasure by force. In one case reported in 1646 in the municipal council of Badajoz, two soldiers billeted in the town beat one women so badly when she refused to sleep with them that she was left close to death and had been given the last sacraments. 159 Soldiers often left their companions with an unwanted legacy, and garrison towns can be distinguished from other communities by the increased numbers of illegitimate births and of foundlings left to the care of the church and municipal authorities. 160 Before the war of 1640-68, the cathedral of Badajoz cared for 10-12 foundlings a year. In 1659 the number had increased to 30 a year. 161 Of cers, on the other hand, with their higher pay and privileged status, were in a position to maintain concubines in rented or even abandoned houses in the settlements where they were garrisoned. 162 In 1647 Philip IV singled out for criticism soldiers receiving a salary of 4 escu dos and above who not only founded entails on their war bene ts but used their pay to keep mistresses in their houses. 163 High-ranking of cers were often notorious offenders. It was said of the rst commander of the Army of Extremadura, the Count of Monterrey, who held of ce for only nine months in 1641, that in Mérida, where he resided, 'no woman was safe from his lechery'. Worse still, he took a shopkeeper as his mistress, and made her two sisters concubines to other senior of cers, one a m aestre de cam po and the other the administrative chief ( comisario gen eral) of cavalry. 164 One of Monterrey's unsuccessful quarries became the mistress of another senior of cer in the Army of Extremadura, m aestre de cam po gen era l Don Juan de Garay, and had a daughter by him. 165 Normally it was left to the local justices to deal with matters that offended public morals. Where high-ranking of cers such as colonels of regiments were involved, the council of Castile at court attempted to intervene and order the removal of the women living in their houses. 166 As for spiritual care, it is no coincidence that the head of army hospitals, generally an ecclesiastic, was given the title 'vicar general'. As the constitution of a royal hospital for workers building the great monastery of the Escorial reveals, preaching and praying warranted much attention 'because it matters more to cure the soul than the body'. 167 The obligation of Christians in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was to make every effort to save their souls and to prepare for the hour of their death. Before dying everyone had to summon a priest who would administer the three sacraments necessary for their nal jour- 160 ney: confession, communion and extreme unction. 168 In addition, in order to organize the funerary rites and to be able to say mass for the salvation of the soul, the church required that all adults draw up a testament before dying. 169 Although death could surprise anyone at any moment because of sudden illness or the outbreak of an epidemic, or an accident or violent incident, those who were most evidently exposed to death were soldiers, especially in times of continuous warfare. 170 Soldiers who were treated in the eld and xed military hospitals were attended by the hospital chaplains, who also cared for the sick and wounded. Two chaplains were attached to Alba's eld hospital that functioned from March to July 1580. 171 However, when isolated on the battle eld or engaged in the siege of a town, soldiers could rarely expect to receive the last sacraments. Only rarely -as in 1642, when four Jesuit priests were present at a battle between a Galician force and the Portuguese army, and heard the confessions of almost all of the Galician soldiers 172 -did the soldiers have the opportunity to ful l at least some of their religious obligations before they engaged in military action. The morale of armies would therefore have been at risk had it not been for the decision to appoint a chaplain to each of the companies of the regular armies, both infantry and cavalry. 173 With a priest attached to each company, military authorities thus hoped to ensure that soldiers were exposed to regular spiritual and religious observance that would help sustain their morale. It was the chaplain's duty to say mass before each battle and, at the end of the ghting, to administer the sacraments to those dying on the battle eld or in the siege lines. However, 168 172 The Jesuits also gave heart to the soldiers as they carried a cruci x with them. One was wounded by a kick from a horse, and had a lucky escape when a shot passed through his hat. Jesu it Letters xix, p. 326. The Portuguese army in question was the one based in the province of Entre Douro e Minho. 173 Mañ eru Ló pez and Cámara Fernández, 'El reclutamiento militar', p. 180, quoting part of a royal instruction.
until the creation of the post of army depositor general at the end of the sixteenth century, unscrupulous chaplains were in a position to persuade dying soldiers to name them as sole heirs to their estate.
174
Others seized the opportunity to steal items of value from the wounded and dead soldiers they attended. Nevertheless, these lucrative if illegal and rather erratic fringe bene ts were insuf cient to offset the shortage of priests, and many companies were unable to nd a chaplain. 175 In an effort to ensure that they ful lled their religious obligations and did not die before making a testament, of cers of the regular armies and of the militias frequently drew up their wills with their local notary before going off to war. 176 Others, like Captain Juan de Estrada, got the notaries of the towns in which they were billeted to add a codicile to their testaments. Estrada had drawn up his testament with a notary of Seville; he added a codicil in Mérida on the day that the 1645 campaign of the Army of Extremadura began. 177 Alternatively, other of cers may have reacted like Don Pedro de Mendoza y Guevara, a m aestro de cam po ( commander of a tercio) of the Army of Extremadura and native and alderman of Badajoz. He only made his testament when he fell seriously ill in Mérida where he was serving. 178 How, though, did common soldiers prepare themselves for death? Those who had no money or belongings -the vast majority -did not make a testament. 179 It is likely that those who possessed some belongings only asked to make a testament when they felt close to death. This was the case in 1659 with a young soldier who had come to Extremadura from the southern province of Murcia to ght with his company against the Portuguese. He fell ill in Mé rida and entered the hospital of the Convent of Our Lady of Mercy, where he made his testament. He asked to be buried in the church of the hospital and dutifully declared that the proceeds from the sale of two houses he owned should be used by the hospital to cure the sick.
IV
The early modern soldier was both pitied and reviled by his contemporaries. In 1572 the Frenchman Pierre Boaistuau wrote that those who chose ghting as a career led 'a tragic and servile life . . . which is so austere and rigorous that the brute beasts hold it in horror'. 181 Others, however, saw the soldier not just as a physical threat to society but also as an immoral miscreant who invariably gave in to the temptation to gamble, drink, fornicate, blaspheme and forget God who awaited him in battle. 182 It was evident, too, that a culture of violence permeated military society both on and off the battle eld. At times the violence shown by a soldier to the enemy was directed with equal vehemence towards his companions in arms and, above all, to civilians. It mattered little whether the civilians were neighbours, compatriots or enemies.
Military encounters of the early modern period were of many types. For the French military commander and theorist, Blaise de Monluc, war was nothing more than a series of ' ghts, assaults, escalades, captures and surprises of towns'. 183 War in peninsular Spain was similar. Even in the seventeenth century, with its lengthy wars, sieges and largescale battles in particular were far less common than small-scale raids and encounters between a few dozen or a few hundred soldiers. 'Small' wars as opposed to 'big' wars predominated. As we have seen, the type of weapon used in these encounters ranged from the latest rearms, eld artillery and grenades to crude weapons such as stones, catapults and slings. Encounters were often stubborn and bloody and occasionally lasted a whole day. 184 Although the successful conclusion of a military action should have ended the soldier's licence to engage in violence, the victors frequently showed no consideration for the vanquished. During the Luso-Spanish war of 1640 to 1668, and above all in the initial 'small war' phase, the victors of skirmishes -whether they were Castilian or Portugueseregularly killed the defeated soldiers, both of cers and men, who failed to escape. 185 Some went so far as to torture and mutilate their captives. In 1641, for example, after an ambush had been set up to capture a band of Portuguese livestock robbers -they were guards of the hills and customs -the entire group of 50 was killed. The so-called captain was decapitated and his head carried back to the acting commander of the Army of Extremadura. 186 A particularly brutal incident was reported in Extremadura in 1650. The survivors related how the troop of Portuguese soldiers cut off Don Francisco de Amezquita's instrument of nature whilst he was still almost alive, they cut off lieutenant Don Juan Cid's ears after killing him, another soldier . . . arrived at Ceclavin with his ears cut off, they killed an aide of the m aestro de cam po and afterwards they spiked him with pikes and spreadeagled him on a rack, and did the same to another cavalry soldier, and two cavalry ensigns and up to fourteen soldiers who were otherwise unhurt, leaving them for dead [ . . .] and to a cavalry soldier who they wounded badly they threw some gunpowder on the ground and blew him up . . . . 187 In Catalonia, too, between 1640 and 1652, some of the prisoners taken in battle were killed. At times it served as an example of what would happen to others -even civilians -if they did not capitulate, particularly to those who refused to negotiate terms during a siege. 188 Civilians in enemy territory were often treated little differently from enemy soldiers. An attack in 1636 on the French border town of San Juan de Luz which involved 4500 soldiers from Navarre and 3000 men from the Basque province of Guipú zcoa provides an example of such violence and, what is even more remarkable, involved the wives of some of the soldiers. While the Spanish soldiers concentrated their attack on the French defenders in the trenches around the town, the wives of the Guipuzcoan troops who had marched with their husbands stormed through the main gate, shouting 'Victory for Spain'. Then, as the women proceeded in organized bands to sack the houses, the Spanish troops attacked the French soldiers who had withdrawn behind barricades in several streets. After the Spanish had broken through one of the barricades, they set re to houses in that district and 'put everyone to the sword that they came across'. 189 Moreover, in spite of the political imperative to persuade rebel subjects to return to obedience, civilians in territories that had revolted were frequently treated just as violently as enemy soldiers. During a raid on the northern Portuguese village of Moimenta in 1641, besides engaging in their usual practice of pillaging the settlement, the Spanish soldiers killed everyone they came across and set re to the houses to which the defenders had them upside down. 197 On at least two occasions, in 1645 and again in 1647, commanders of the Army of Extremadura had to resort to instructing their troops to kill only soldiers, but clearly such orders were widely ignored. 198 Pedro Calderó n de la Barca's play El Alca lde de Zalam ea ( The Mayor of Zalamea) , set in Extremadura during the march of the Duke of Alba's troops through the province to Portugal in 1580, highlights two of the commonest outrages committed by soldiers billeted in civilian homes -rape and confrontations with peasants. 199 The need to obtain food and lodging from an unarmed civilian population led soldiers to treat civilians in the same violent manner as they dealt with foreign or enemy civilian populations. 200 Similarly, to meet their need for food and money, some military units raided municipal grain stores, siezed the taxes collected in regional treasuries, and threatened the civil authorites. 201 In June 1639, the tercios that were transferred from Navarre to Catalonia were accused of committing all manner of atrocities against the inhabitants of the countryside through which they marched: forcing them to give money to the soldiers and of cers, and battering, wounding, raping and cutting their ears off with such fury and cruelty that many of them died. 202 Confrontations between civilians and soldiers billeted in their localities were commonplace. Usually one or two deaths resulted. A notable case occurred in 1626 in the Andalusian town of Carmona, when 10 inhabitants and 15 of the Neapolitan soldiers billeted there were killed during a brawl. 203 there, and killed any Walloons they encountered in the streets. Before the riot was quelled 60 men had been killed and many wounded. 205 It was inevitable that the close intermingling of soldiers and civilians in the peninsula would generate tension and violence. The progressive professionalization and slow separation and isolation of the military from civil society would be left to a later period. 206 Until then, the king and his council of war hoped that the military ethic of loyalty, discipline and sacri ce would prevail. In reality, however, the behaviour of soldiers was largely determined by the conditions of daily life, the perceived opportunities and threats in their immediate environment, and the culture of violence.
While it is inappropriate to speak in blanket terms of the experience of warfare of Spain's soldiers, especially when covering much of the peninsula over an extended period, it seems certain that the conditions of military service in the peninsula during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were generally hard and unpleasant. It is unsurprising that few people envied or were eager to share the experiences of Spain 's peninsular soldiers: the hardships and dangers of battle and commonplace violence in which they risked death or serious injury, the uncertain pay and provisions, the limited spiritual and health care, hardly compensated for by a few unpredictable 'perks'. Writing in 1596, a secretary of Spain's council of war revealed how knowledge of the soldier's experiences negatively affected recruitment. The recruiting captains only succeeded in enlisting a few men because of 'the little one can prosper nowadays in this profession, the many maimed who turn up from all over, the destitution that they and those who are not soldiers recount about where they have come from, seeing many honourable soldiers suffer and not be rewarded, and that generally they are hated and viewed and treated badly. 207 The experiences of Spanish soldiers were little different from those of their contemporaries throughout western Europe. Expressing what many, perhaps all, who experienced military service thought, in 1631 an English soldier of the Thirty Years War wrote: 'it is a great deal of misery that a soldier doth endure, besides danger, every minute of his life.'
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